Recent Supreme Court case law on procedural deadlines in the field of contentious-administrative jurisdiction

Judgment of the Supreme Court number 58/2024, handed down on 17 January (Appeal number 3996/2022)

In this ruling, the Chamber resolves the contentious-administrative appeal lodged against the judgment of the High Court of Justice of the Community of Valencia of 15 February 2022, by which the regional court dismissed the appeal lodged against a personal income tax settlement on the grounds that the appeal was lodged out of time, having exceeded the two-month period provided for in article 46 of the Law on Jurisdiction.

The question that is of objective interest for the formation of case law consists of: ‘To reaffirm, reinforce or preserve the existing case law with regard to the application of the provision contained in Article 135.5 LEC to the two-month time limit provided for the filing of the contentious-administrative appeal’.

For a better understanding of what is being debated here, the aforementioned precept establishes that the presentation of pleadings and documents, whatever the rule, if subject to a procedural or substantive time limit, may be made up to fifteen hours on the working day following the expiry of the time limit. In short, we are referring to the so-called ‘period of grace’ and its application in the filing of contentious-administrative appeals.

The Chamber affirms that there is no reason to deviate from the consolidated case law on the application of article 135.5 of the LEC to contentious-administrative appeals and, in coherence, reiterates the previous case law and reaffirms, establishing as an interpretative criterion, that ‘the provision contained in article 135.5 LEC is applicable to the two-month period established for the filing of contentious-administrative appeals’.

In short, this ruling is extremely important given that it declares the ‘period of grace’ applicable to the filing of the appeal and, consequently, the possibility of being able to file a contentious-administrative appeal until fifteen o'clock on the working day following the expiry of the deadline.
 

Supreme Court judgment number 687/2024, handed down on 24 April 2024 (Appeal number 3820/2021).

In the aforementioned judgment, the Chamber resolves the appeal lodged by the Regional Government of Andalusia against the Order of the Administrative Chamber of the High Court of Justice of Andalusia (Granada), dated 17 February 2021 (part of the precautionary measures) which dismissed the appeal for reconsideration lodged against the Order which declared the precautionary measure requested by the company, the opposing party in the dispute, to be admissible.

We are dealing here with an interlocutory injunction in which the administration was granted leave to be heard so that it could oppose the interim measure requested by the opposing party. However, once the period granted had elapsed without the administration having presented any arguments, an order was issued which put an end to the incident, and agreed to the precautionary measure requested. In response to this decision, the Regional Government of Andalusia argued that, since it had been denied the possibility of presenting its arguments within the special period provided for in Article 128 of the Law on Jurisdiction (LJ), this deprived it of the possibility of the rehabilitation of time limits, causing it a lack of defence.

We recall at this point that the aforementioned precept establishes that ‘Time limits cannot be extended, and once they have elapsed, the corresponding Court Clerk will consider the right as lapsed and the procedure that has not been used as lost. However, the relevant document shall be admitted and shall produce its legal effects if it is presented within the day on which the decision is notified, except in the case of time limits for the preparation or lodging of appeals’.

Thus, the question of cassation interest focuses on determining whether the reinstatement of the time limit provided for in article 128 of the LJ is applicable to the hearing granted in an application for precautionary measures.

The judgement states that, in the specific case, once the period for allegations to oppose the precautionary measure requested had elapsed, ‘the procedure should have been declared precluded, and as it was not a document preparing or lodging the appeal, the possibility of reinstatement of the period provided for in article 128 of the LJ was applicable, by virtue of the possibility of reinstatement of the period provided for in article 128 of the LJ. 128 of the LJ, by virtue of which the party could present its written pleadings on the same day that it was notified of the decision... until 15:00 hours on the following working day, in application of the provision contained in art. 135 of the LEC’.

Consequently, the Supreme Court, in response to the question of appeal, established as a doctrine that ‘the reinstatement of the time limit provided for in art. 128 LJCA is applicable to the hearing granted in an application for precautionary measures’.

Undoubtedly, the ruling handed down, with its doctrine, contributes to greater legal certainty with regard to procedural time limits. In this case, in a specific procedure, that of a hearing in a piece of precautionary measures, which is the one that is specifically answered, as it is the one that was specifically formulated.

However, we cannot fail to mention, as it is transcendental in the processing of any contentious administrative appeal, that the Supreme Court adds and extends this rehabilitation of the time limit ‘to the cases in which the hearing is granted, whether it is issued in the main proceedings or in a piece of precautionary measures’. In other words, in any pleading procedure, the aforementioned extension of the time limit provided for in Art. 128 LJ is applicable.

We therefore find ourselves, as we have already mentioned, before a judgment of great interest in the field of contentious-administrative jurisdiction.